

## Stocks to Watch: Colonial Difference, Planetary “Multiculturalism” and Radical Planning

Walter Mignolo\*

### 1. Introduction

The immediate context of my reflections has been insinuated by Haripriya Rangan’s remarks (in this issue) on Leonie Sandercock’s book, *Towards Cosmopolis: Planning for Multicultural Cities* (1998). Rangan began by quoting Sandercock when she suggests that radical planning practices emerged “from experience with and a critique of existing unequal power relations and distributions of power, opportunity, and resources. The goal of these practices is to work for structural transformation of systematic inequalities and, in the process, to empower those who have been systematically disempowered. The focus of the radical practice will depend on the focus of the critique” (Sandercock 1998, pp. 97-98). Furthermore, Sandercock adds, “This new paradigm requires a very different style of planning, a familiarity with the life ways of communities, and new kinds of cultural and political literacies” (Sandercock, 1998, p. 129). Rangan makes a couple of interesting observations about these statements. The first one is about Sandercock position on radical planning. Rangan observes:

Sandercock’s new modes of cultural and political literacy are predominantly derived from postmodern critiques of meta-narratives, the politics of identity, and theories of difference [...]. Thus, for her, the presence of peoples from different cultures in city-regions of industrially-advanced countries requires a new planning paradigm that recognises *difference* in conceptions of community, in modes of *listening*, knowledge, and forms of action [...]. It [the new paradigm] is to be found in ‘insurgent practices’ that produce a ‘thousand tiny empowerment’ (quoted by Rangan, Sandercock 1998, pp. 57-104, 107-25, 129-156).

\* William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies, Professor

The second observation made by Rangan is a critique of certain limitations of this “new paradigm” based on Sandercock’s (and Friedmann’s 1987) conception of the “modern state”. Rangan critique here is double. On the one hand, to Friedmann’s (1987) and Sandercock’s conceptualization of the State as a negative force of urban planning. And secondly, to their lack of distinction between the State in the First and the Third World. Rangan advances here an important critique to radical planning that introduces the frictions, let’s say, between the postmodern and the postcolonial in history and social organization. Rangan makes visible, in other words, the colonial difference in radical planning. Here objections come from the fact that in her view “understanding culturally-diverse outcomes” cannot be limited to metropolitan centers of the First World. Postcolonial subjects – according to Rangan – “offer new ways of understanding culturally-diverse outcomes of state-led planning and social action in societies once ruled by European nations” (Rangan, this issue, p. 53). In this regard, one could add that the problems Bolivia has, and that have been discussed and acted upon during the presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Victor Hugo Cárdenas (1992-1996) (República de Bolivia, 1997). “Multiculturalism” in Bolivia, a country with almost sixty percent of the population being from Quechua and Aymara descent, is not related to massive migrations. On the contrary, its roots can be found in the colonial horizon of modernity since the sixteenth and the internal colonialism of State builders since the beginning of the nineteenth century (Rivera-Cusicanqui, 1992).

Rangan offers an alternative to the views of radical planning advanced by Friedmann (1987) and Sandercock (1998), as she looks, instead, at a state-planned agrarian reform. With this example, Rangan opens up radical planning to a dialogue with the State and, on the other, introduces variables from local histories with dense colonial legacies. Rangan is particularly interested in the dialogue between social movements and the State in India and in “particular discursive strategies and practices that used and reshaped notions of democracy, citizenship, and development” (Rangan, this issue, p. 55). Key in Rangan’s argument is the concept of *translation*, to which I come back below. The issue she is looking at is not only discursive translation from one language to the other. It is much more than that as it embraces translation between cosmologies. For instance the translations of (modern) European cosmology into (traditional) Indian cosmologies or, of Indian epistemology into European ones. She is thinking, in other words, in “translated concepts of democracy, development, and legitimized forms of political practices” and of

“*understanding and translation of ‘radical’ planning and social action culturally-diverse and culturally-diversifying contexts in the world*” (Rangan, this issue, p. 55). To follow up on Rangan’s argument: eventually, to its implementation, across deep differences generate colonialism, macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality would be necessary.

## 2. On macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality

There is an intellectually honest and moving moment in Sandercock’s book *Towards Cosmopolis* (1998). It is narrated at the beginning of chapter 4 when she tells the story of a class she taught at UCLA, a few weeks after the Los Angeles riots, in which she showed the video “Race Matters”, a program conducted by Phil Donahue. A tense and silenced moment followed, when the class regrouped after a coffee break. An African American woman broke up the silence and said that “the African American students were appalled and offended by the program deeply disappointed in me for showing it; that it was a racist program that perpetuated the idea that Blacks were ‘the problem’, when in fact racism that was a problem...”. After narrating that tense moment Sandercock describes her own reaction. “I was stunned”, she said, “speechless, as was the rest of the class” (1998, p. 108). And she continues:

Looking back, I was not only naïve in my expectations of the kind of discussion that might ensue from seeing such a program. I was also blind, that is, I was too naive to see that there were different ways of “reading” the program. While I dismiss the moderator’s behavior as dumb, African Americans were deeply offended. While I thought that the program had great merit in terms of *inclusionary politics*, giving voice to communities of color, my students saw that it was being run by a white man. And while I experienced the presentation as the three African Americans as constructive contributions to an understanding of what could be done in their communities, my students saw this as a misrepresentation of the ‘real issue’, white racism (1998, p. 108).

In what follows I would argue, first, that the real issue, of which racism is a symptom, is the persistence of coloniality of power and the colonial difference. I would then enter into the dialogue between Rangan and Sandercock (who brings a case from India) and Sandercock (who reflects mainly from a North Atlantic and the British Commonwealth), from a Latin American perspective. By which I mean from a modern/colonial horizon dif-

from that of India. By so doing, I would stress the relationships between multiculturalism and the geo-political horizon of colonial modernities (since 1500). My focus and my frame is what Immanuel Wallerstein called "the modern world-system" (Wallerstein, 1974; Wallerstein, 1999), that I will render as "modern/colonial world system". My departure follows up the contributions by Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (1992, 1997) and Argentinian philosopher Enrique Dussel (1998a and 1998b; Mignolo 2000). My major claim is that "multiculturalism" should be understood and, consequently dealt with, in the colonial horizon of modernity, since the sixteenth century. Modernity/coloniality came together in the entire sixteenth century during the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit that propelled an incipient European capitalism and charted the racial geopolitical map of the world, well and alive until today. Anibal Quijano (1992, 1997) introduced the notion of "coloniality of power" to make visible what was invisible in Wallerstein's concept of "modern world-system." Wallerstein certainly was aware of "colonialism" but blind to the 'coloniality of power' and its consequence.

Here I am interested in two major consequences of the coloniality of power. One is the making of the colonial difference. The second is that while the colonial difference divided categorically the world into certain positive values that were located in Christian Europe from the Renaissance to WWII, it became also a locus of oppositional enunciation. Coloniality of power manifests itself, for Quijano (1997), as a racial principle of classification with profound epistemic and economic implications. Toward the end of the fifteenth century and beginning of the sixteenth, the old struggle between Christians, Jews and Moors acquired a new meaning and a new articulation. Jews and Moors were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula. The Spanish Crown, linked with the capitalist entrepreneurs from Genoa (Arrighi, 1994), was able to exploit the reaches of the Americas and support the triumph of Christianity. "Purity of blood" was a normal principle established at the beginning of the sixteenth century that allowed the Inquisition (one of the first modern-state institutions) to maintain racial divides on religious principles. Furthermore, the emergence of the Atlantic commercial circuit brought to consideration the need for a new classification to accommodate what today we call Amerindians. Last but not least, for economical and legal reasons, massive contingents of African slaves were transported to the Americas. For the first time in the history of humanity, "blackness" became equated with

people by continent and religions, from an epistemic perspective grounded in the Greek and Latin traditions, and refashioned by a growing capitalism grounded on the Atlantic commercial circuit. This logic, the logic of the modern/colonial world was, later on, reproduced and resignified when British imperialism and French and German colonialism replaced the Christian by the Civilizing Mission. Immanuel Kant diagrammed anew the "original" racial map of the sixteenth century and clearly equated continental divides with skin colors.

In section four of *Observations on the Feelings of the Beautiful and the Sublime* ([1764] 1960) Kant divided the planet, geo-politically, between "the people of our part of the world (p. 97) and the "other parts of the world" (p. 109). For Kant Red people were located in America (e.g., the Amerindians), Blacks in Africa, Yellows in Asia and Whites in Europe. Coloniality of power has been since the sixteenth century and is still today an epistemic principle for classifying the colonial world in relation to Europe on the principle of skin color and brain capacity (i.e., race and rationality). The location of knowledge was in the Greek and Latin languages, and was translated and produced in the European vernaculars, which became, coincidentally, the imperial languages. "Knowledge" beyond the geo-political and epistemic space moving from Greece, westward in the north of the Mediterranean, was classified in correspondence with skin color and continental divide. The colonial difference deprived other languages and races from epistemic power. Thus, in the sixteenth century, Occidentalism was the overarching metaphor upon which the West constituted itself as the West and created the condition for the debut of Orientalism, in the eighteenth century. Epistemic power was located in the very act of enunciation that classified the world according to race, languages and knowledge (Mignolo, 1998). The space of the colonial difference, however, did not remain passive. There is a long history, in Asia, Africa and the Americas of insurgent practices that were "successfully" silenced by the coloniality of power, the dark side of modernity. Since 1970, however, and there is an overall recognition of this fact, the colonial difference became a location not only for "acting" (e.g., rebellions) but for "thinking" and the emergence of intellectuals of social movements. The transformation of the colonial difference from shame to celebration is contributing to the des-centering and provincializing the linguistic and geo-historical location of epistemology (from Greek and Latin to vernacular European languages

(Mignolo, 1998, 2000). This logic embodies the epistemic power of the slave who knows and enacts, simultaneously, the logic of the slave and the logic of the master while the master is limited to its own, provincial and territorial logic.

Important consequences could be derived from this argument to enter in dialogue with Standercock's and Rangan's concerns: history, theory and the ethics of inclusion on the one hand, and the politics translation and participation on the other. Let's take one issue at the time.

2.1. "New histories" that will include what has been excluded are, of course, necessary as Sandercock's rightly insists (1998a, 1998b), but they are not enough. "New histories" from the perspective of modernity will continue to pile up, will indeed include part of what has been up to that point excluded, but will contribute to reproduce the logic of history and the colonial difference (Mignolo, 2000b). Rethinking history from the perspective of modernity changes the content but not the terms of the conversation. In order to change the terms of the conversation, histories from the perspective of coloniality are needed. Such histories would not be "new" in the progressive and linear sense of time (where the "new" replaces the "old" and we need new histories as we need new cars to replace the old ones), but "emergent" (like "emergent markets"). It is important to underline that histories from the perspective of coloniality has to co-exist, across the colonial difference, with histories from the perspective of modernity. Rather than histories, I would prefer to insist on the need of macro-history that shall simultaneously be theories, critical theories grounded in the historical horrors and memories of the colonial horizon of modernity. Such macro-histories would be necessary to legitimize ethical and political claims from subaltern positions. Thinking from the colonial difference is basically thinking from subaltern positions. Without such macro-narratives/theories from the perspective of coloniality, subaltern claims would always be absorbed by existing macro-narratives (e.g., Christianity, Western Civilization, International Proletarian Revolution, Modernity and Development). The lack of macro-narratives (theories) from the perspective of coloniality is precisely the reason why subalterns cannot speak; there is no theoretical frames to prevent and contest that subaltern statements be absorbed, twisted and interpreted from the perspective of modernity. For Kant, for instance, "The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr. Hume challenges anyone who cite a single example in which a Negro has shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of

thousands of blacks who are transported elsewhere from their count although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites some continually aloft from the lowest rabble, and though superior gifts earn respect in world" (Kant [1764], 1960, p. 111).

The possibility of thinking macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality (of which I will give more examples below) began to change the ways issues like "new" historiography, "listening" to the subalterns liberal project of "inclusion" have been cast and approached. All these projects are necessary but, at the same time, have the limits of reproducing macro-narrative (albeit enlarging them) and, by the same to reproducing the colonial difference.

"New" and more inclusive histories are necessary but not sufficient. I develop this statement with the help of Dussel's distinction between "Discourse Ethics" and "Ethics of Liberation". The fundamental difference between Discourse Ethics and Liberation Ethics, Dussel stresses, is the starting point (Dussel, 1998, p. 414). What does he mean that? Discourse Ethics "starts" from an ideal model of community communication in which all participants are imagined with the same rights and sharing similar social conditions. Ethics of Liberation, instead, starts from the marginalized from communication, those who are being spoken but do not have the right themselves to speak in the community communication. Ethics of Liberation locates itself in the exceptional situation of the excluded. More specifically, Dussel underlines that starting points of Ethics of Liberation are "the multiple every asymmetric processes of domination that are being exercised by women, races, oppressed popular and indigenous cultures, pedagogical processes that reproduce oppression, a majority of States all over the world in no-right situations, the periphery or the (ex) colonial areas of the world that are still at disadvantage and under military violence, movements from the U.S., the 'dirty wars' in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, etc.; counter-revolutions as the one orchestrated against Nicaragua in 1979" (Dussel, 1998, p. 415; a similar point has been made by the Portuguese sociologist Boaventura de Souza Santos, 1995, pp. 27-55). Dussel accepts the principle of "inclusion" proposed by Discourse Ethics as a necessary process of reform, but suggests that, simultaneously, the principle of "participation of the excluded" as a process of transformation be thought and implemented. That is the task he attributes to Ethics of Liberation. A simplified version although pedagogically clear, will be

say that while Discourse Ethics “starts” from Kant, Ethics of Liberation “starts” from Rigoberta Menchú. I do not feel I have here to explain who Kant is. I do feel, however, that if I do not have to explain who Menchú is, particularly after her Nobel Prize award, I do have to explain how can she be compared with Kant on ethics, politics, justice and human rights. This is what Dussel means when he said that the fundamental difference between Discourse Ethics and Ethics of Liberation is the “starting point”; that Menchú and the Zapatistas are critical theories on their own right and they have as much to tell us as Kant, Marx or Habermas.

Rigoberta Menchú became internationally known when she obtained the Peace Nobel Prize, and she was known in Europe and the Americas in the early 1980's when her testimonial narrative was published in Spanish (*Me llamo Rigoberta Menchú y así me nació la conciencia*) (Menchú, 1983). The narrative was collected and edited by Venezuelan anthropologist Elizabeth Burgos Debrás, who was already living in Paris in the early 1980s. It was translated into English as *I, An Indian Woman in Guatemala* (Menchú, 1984). The title of the translation makes it difficult to understand why Dussel would underline the expression “*así me nació la conciencia*” (“this is how my consciousness was awoken”), in order to underline a theory that emerges from a practice and a practice that emerges from the condition of Indigenous exploitation. In Latin America, these conditions have been continuous since the sixteenth century, and re-articulated during the nation-building process in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The English translation emphasized the autobiographical first person (that send us back to Benjamin Franklin autobiography), the exoticism of an Indian woman (gender issue) and the country, Guatemala (that places the book in the domain of Latin American and area studies).

Let's pursue Dussel's engagement with Menchú's narrative, which he takes as a philosophical and theoretical perspective – a “paradigmatic starting point” for Ethics Liberation. The following paragraph is from chapter XXXI (“Women and Political Commitment. Rigoberta Renounces Marriage and Motherhood”) of Menchú narrative:

There is something else we are discovering in Guatemala to do with intellectuals and illiterate people. We learned that we haven't all got the ability of an intellectual: an intellectual is perhaps quicker and able to make finer syntheses. But nevertheless, others of us have perhaps the same ability for other things. Before, everyone used to think that a leader had to be someone who knew how to read.

there are certain exchanges that have to be made. That is not unusual. I think that every movement has gone through the process whereby an opportunist arrives, feels that he is worth more than the others and abuses their confidence. At one time, many of our leaders would come from the capital to see us in the *fincas* and say: “You peasants are stupid, you don't read or study”. And the peasants told them: “You can go to Hell with your books. We know you don't make revolution with books, you make it through struggle” (1984, p. 222).

Menchú is not referring here to the *ladinos*, who exploits the Indians, but to urban intellectuals, Marxists perhaps, teaching the Indians how to fight for their rights. Secondly, and in this context, Menchú's denials of books cannot be seen as a “populist” slogan exploited by military dictators like Juan Domingo Peron, in Argentina, that despised intellectual work and praised the “natural” intuition of the “people”. What Menchú is articulating here is a strong intellectual argument beyond right and left, which was taken up (and most probably independently from Menchú but based on the same socio-historical experience), by the Zapatistas (Dussel, 1994; Mignolo, 1997). It shall be remembered that Menchú, in recent years, has experienced opposition among “their own people” that has been exploited by the media (*Newsweek*, June 21, 1999). An argument that has created a certain discomfort among scholars and the media. A book by an U.S. based anthropologist, David Stoll, facilitated media criticism against Menchú by “revealing” that she “*lied*” in certain aspect of her narrative. More precisely, Stoll claimed that,

While interviewing survivors of political violence in the late 1980's, I began to come across significant problems in the life story she told at the start of her career. *There is no doubt about the most important points: that a dictatorship massacred thousands of indigenous peasants, that the victims included half of Rigoberta's immediate family, that she fled to Mexico to save her life, and that she joined a revolutionary movement to liberate her country. On these points, Rigoberta's account is beyond challenge and deserves that attention it receives.* But in other respects, such as the situation of her family and village before the war, other survivors gave me a rather different picture, which is borne out of the available records (Stoll, 1999, viii; italics mine).

Stoll detected the “lies” in the personal dimension of Menchú's life, in the domain of the “I” of the English title. However, he was unable to see beyond it and to establish links between what he himself recognized as “beyond doubt” and what Dussel underlined as the “awakening of

to my argument to avoid accusations that I am idealizing Rigoberta Menchú. I went into these details to show that I am aware of them and that, in spite of everything, I am glad that Rigoberta Menchú exists, tell stories as the one she told, and says the things that she says. The fact that there are indigenous people who are critical should not diminish Menchú's contributions to social transformation while, simultaneously, reinforcing the idea that what Menchú does is only of interest to indigenous population and not to all, Indians and non-Indians. The implications of Dussel's 'starting point' are related to this issue, the colonial epistemic difference: What Kant or Habermas said is assumed to be valid for all, not just for Germans. What Menchú or the Zapatistas propose is supposed to be relevant for Indigenous people only! It is frankly OK if not all the indigenous people in Guatemala support Menchú or the Zapatistas. What is important is that they have support from non-Indigenous people as well as Kant and Habermas are supported and followed by people who are not German. Both, Menchú and the Zapatistas are introducing a critical consciousness, establishing the non-place of theory and mapping a macro-narrative from the perspective of coloniality grounded in the "500 years" seen from the other side of the "modern world-system". What they have to say about justice, democracy and human rights is no less relevant to what Habermas or Rawls have to say: That is, again, the meaning of Dussel's "starting point".

But now, what is the relevance of this excursus for my argument? I was addressing the larger picture in which Discourse Ethics and Radical Planning claim for "inclusion" of the excluded or, as Sandercock would say, "making the invisible visible" (Sandercock, 1998a, 1998b). My argument was that the politics and ethics of inclusion, although necessary, are ethics and politics of "reform". Ethics of Liberation proposes "participation", rather than "inclusion", of the excluded. While the concept of "inclusion" presupposes the pre-existence of a domain in condition to include the excluded (e.g., like immigrants and aliens crossing borders), the concept of "participation" underlines the task, rather than a pre-existing space. Such task has to be accomplished by "participants" holding different conceptualizations of common "connectors" such as democracy, human rights and justice. If Rigoberta Menchú is offering a theoretical perspective in its own right, that can not be subsumed under Kant or Marx, then what is the role of the planner or the intellectual that have been extending Kant or Marx in "support" and "defense" of people like Rigoberta Menchú? And of the people and situations that motivate Menchú political struggle and theoretical articulation?

I would like to go back to the place I left off - Sandercock's narrat her experience, in L.A., after showing the video "Race Mat Sandercock proposed, after the story and her own reflections on i instead of concentrating on the difference that theory makes, attr shall be devoted to an understanding of the "theory that diffe makes". And she continues:

"Difference" must become a category of analysis within planning theory, class and gender have already begun to be acknowledged as such. Diff already informs the politics of planning. *If the purpose of planning theo contribute to good practice, then the matter of difference must inform dis within planning theory. If we want to achieve social justice and respect for diversity in multicultural cities, then we need to theorize a productive po difference.* And if we want to foster a more democratic, *inclusory* pro planning, then we need to start *listening* to the voices of difference (1998a, 1

That is, one should be able to "listen" to the difference (like Rig Menchú, the Zapatistas or other anonymous voices) the same w "listens" to Emmanuel Kant or Marx; to Pierre Bourdieu or Harvey, etc. The theory that difference makes is asserting the "non of theory as Chicana feminist Sonia Saldivar-Hull rightly puts it looking at prefaces, prologues, manifestos, poetry in which gend and sexuality are theorized among Chicanas (Hull, 2000).

The concept of "inclusion" and that of "listening" belong to th paradigm. You have to "listen" in order to "include", but listeni inclusion presuppose that the place from where listening and inclu enacted is beyond doubt. "Respect" and "recognition" (Taylor, 15 25-74) are necessary but not sufficient. "Participation" (at the sar from above and from below) may be the final goal of every proj genuinely fights for justice, human rights and an overall dem society, including urban planning. The idea of "participation" intrc new dimension beyond the limits of "listening", "inclusio "recognition". It demands a space of negotiation rather than an place, with doors, that the included will have to cross, evei gatekeepers are full of good will. Both "participation" and "in would have to co-exist; they do not exclude each other. Th movements Rangan describes, that are claiming to be included in of modernization and development, are indeed important (Ran issue, and 1996, pp. 205-226). However, this project cannot exhaust the alternatives for social transformation nor to be tal model to be exported around the world (my concluding remarks

“Participation” in the sense described above is more difficult to achieve, as the Zapatistas uprising demonstrated. There was and is a need to get up in arms to claim the right to speak and participate. Certainly, the fight for “inclusion” shall not be given up in hope of a better choice, but neither the fight for “participation” shall be given up because it is more difficult to achieve.

My point, then, is that the question is not just the cultural difference that multiculturalism made visible, but the colonial difference that remains still invisible under the bright colors of multicultural expressions. “Participation”, as Dussel conceptualized it, needs macro-narratives (as historical theories), that will give the “new voices” an authorized locus of enunciation and not only recognition and inclusion. Simplifying matters one could say that today, in the Western world, four macro-narratives are in place and enacted – simultaneously – for control, management and domination; and for resistant claims for justice and equity. Those four macro-narratives are (Boff, 1995, pp. 140-1):

- Christian utopias and its dream of a society of brothers and sisters; a just society in which all people share; a society aware of the social consequences of the fact that every human being is a child of God or of Nature;
- Emancipation narrative that takes after the French revolution and on the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity; the ideals of participatory and popular democracy; progressive parties, etc.;
- Socialist and communities utopia, revolutionary visions taking the side of the oppressed; an utopia born from the rejection of deprivation and suffering;
- Radical humanism utopia, placing the value of human being and committed to human suffering in general, not only from oppression but from more general limitations of human life.

All these macro-narratives can work in either direction, as justification of violence in the name of an ideal; or as justification of rebellion against the justification of violence in the name of an ideal. For instance, violation of human rights could be justified in the name of cultural differences (e.g. China). However, the very existence of human rights carries, on the one hand, the hegemonic mark of a particular culture and, on the other, the weight of contributing to maintain a cultural difference (e.g., the defense of Western Civilization confronted with the danger of communism). All of these macro-narratives are part of the imaginary of modernity and all of them are blind to the colonial difference – a blindness that calls for macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality. Note that these narratives

coloniality of power that engenders the colonial difference as epistemic domination.

Helping the victims of colonialism is indeed part of the “good” (reformative) project of any of the four macro-narratives. But what is needed is the space for macro-narratives (in plural) from the perspective of coloniality (e.g., the variety of colonial experiences through the modern/colonial world, since 1500 to today stage of global coloniality or of coloniality at large). Macro-narratives, in plural, from the perspective of coloniality would offer alternatives to “abstract universal” philosophical presuppositions of the four macro-narratives I underlined. The alternatives is “diversity as a universal project,” or diversity, instead of a “new abstract universal” which will maintain the terms of the conversation, the need of a “new” universality. In these terms, the “theory that differences make” are the macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality, by intellectuals of all kinds (like Enrique Dussel or Rigoberta Menchú), who will theorize oppression from the experience (historically lived and/or historically learned) of coloniality. That is, the theory that differences make are the theories coming from the periphery, from the zones of the barbarians and underdeveloped, from the “traditions” that “modernity” put aside.

Let me explain. Planning (urban, ecological, cosmopolitan, technological, etc.) is, for many, an urgent necessity to sober the aggressive designs of transnational corporation (some times referred to as “the end of history”) and to cope with the weakening of the state and the crisis of socialist projects. There is a significant numerical agreement on the fact that “development” is finite and that development as accumulation brought simultaneously the deterioration of nature and conversion of life into commodity, forcing capitalist projects to preserve nature on the name of artificial reproduction. As a consequence, technology makes possible, on the one hand, the extermination of nature and, on the other, the invention of “procedures that favor the conservation of the environment and the reduction of any undesirable effects of the models in question” (Boff, 1995, p. 20; see also Escobar, 1995). If the struggle is between the various possibilities of “planning for development as accumulation” and the various possibilities of “planning for social justice” the spectrum is triple rather than double. In the first case, planning means management toward increasing production and accumulation. The second case, instead, could be either geared toward reform or transformation. Both are necessary to counter the first, although they need to be distinguished and one way of

Geo-historical locations are important here, as Rangan clearly underlines, in this issue. The relevance is not dictated by geo-historical determinism, but by the geo-historical configurations of the colonial past and the ways in which colonial differences have affected the materiality of life, transforming subjectivity and the meaning of humanness, life, nature. Colonization and decolonization were and are not the same in Mexico, Algeria, Jamaica, or India. The theory that difference makes is not only racial but also geo-historical. Geo-historical locations and racial differences are, of course, linked in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world through the colonial difference. The modern/colonial world is indeed the distribution of the planet organized around colonial differences. Capitalism, whose expansion was constitutive of modernity and the Western world, is now crossing the colonial difference. Global coloniality, at the end of the twentieth century, has two major features. The first is that capitalism no longer exploits the periphery from the center, but moved to the periphery; and by doing so, crossed the colonial difference. The second, as a consequence, is that capitalism could adapt itself to ideologies other than liberalism and neo-liberalism and to enter in an era of capitalistic diversity. What possible futures could be imagined under these conditions?

### 3. Capital diversity and ethnic differences: translation, border thinking and diversity

David Harvey (in this issue) placed planning in a tandem with self-regulation. He focuses on Polanyi's "great transformation" (Polanyi, 1957) and the market as a self-regulative mechanism. Conceptually, Polanyi's thesis introduced a radical conceptual transformation that, as far as I know, went unnoticed. And this "great conceptual transformation" could be explained in two steps. First, it reversed the crucial eighteenth century distinction between "order" and "chaos" and, indirectly, moved the carpet from under Hume's thesis according to which the State was a necessary "cultural" construction preventing chaos and establishing order. The self-regulatory principle established by the market shows that the alternative is not "social chaos" vs "social order" but that there is something in between, a self-regulatory mechanism, neither natural chaos nor human management. The second conceptual transformation that indirectly Polanyi's thesis suggests, is that Kant's hopes of modeling the planetary *polis* according to the laws of the *cosmos* was wrong headed (Mignolo,

2000b). *Cosmo-polis* cannot longer be imagined today as it was in circumstances. The second moment of the conceptual transformation could be located in Ilya Prigogine's (1977) revalorization of chaos natural order. We could, perhaps, read Prigogine not as a rev eighteenth century opposition between chaos and order but, instead "natural order" not governed by laws, as Newton believed, but a "self-regulated organism" that can accommodate a certain amount of chaos (Maturana and Varela, 1982). If we follow this logic to the limit, we can say that the market as a "self-regulated mechanism" is parallel to a "self-regulated organism". This proposition replicates the distinction between culture and nature, while it is known that the technological reproduction of life casts doubts on the distinction between organism and mechanism. However, we are not yet to the point in which "life" would have to be re-conceptualized because the longer "natural" reproduction. Once again, it is necessary to maintain the coexistence of both conceptions.

However, it is the need to control both self-regulated mechanisms and self-regulated organisms that is relevant here. The need (and the desire) to manage and control overthrows the distinction between nature and culture. Control and management are cultural forms operating through regulated mechanisms and on self-regulated organisms. Capitalist mechanisms and management of nature, and the technological reproduction and management of nature, in the last analysis, the ultimate limit of life and death would be a possible scenario for the second consequence Polanyi identifies: if/when the market takes over social regulation and takes it away from the hands of the State:

The idea of self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human substance of society; it would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of the disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way (quoted by Harvey, this issue).

In the overall scheme of things or, in the historical version of the colonial horizon of modernity, the self-regulatory mechanism of the market and the planning of the state extended themselves all over the planet. In a way, they, the Market and the State, became two global forces that explain why decolonization in Asia and Africa, after WWII, challenged the model of the State. Decolonization claimed a sovereign

that will end with the period of colonial dependency. Marx and Engels communist manifesto was, in between the first and the second wave of decolonization, an alternative utopia to the complicity between a self-regulatory (and planetary) Market and a liberal (and colonial) State. Global designs, be them self-regulatory, liberal state planning or socialist utopia, emerged from a particular local history (the history of capitalism and modern/Western Europe) and imposed themselves all over other particular local histories. This was done in such a way that the colonial horizon of modernity became a struggle between local histories projecting global design and local histories accommodating themselves to them. Capitalism, however, remained until recently under the control of those countries in which capitalism emerged, grew and expanded.

At the end of the twentieth century the situation is changing radically. Capitalism is moving to areas of the world (East and South Asia, mainly) in which the ideology that accompanied its emergence, growth and expansion may not be clearly reproduced. Thus, the slogans "capitalism without Westernization" or "modernity without modernization", respond to the fact that we are entering a phase of capitalistic diversity that complicates the picture of the ethnic differences so prominent in the past decades. There are two scenarios to evaluate this situation and to relate it with the issues radical planners are confronting - clearly exposed in the articles by Sandercock and Rangan in this issue. Ethnic diversity in the last quarter of the twentieth century was linked to decolonization and massive migration, driven and oriented by the homogeneous geo-historical locus of capital accumulation: the North Atlantic (Northwestern Europe and the U.S.). The second scenario is, if you wish, the migration of capitalism rather than of people. Would the planetarization of capitalism lead to a (neo) liberal and (neo) Christian world as the ideologies that accompanied capitalism since its inception, of capital diversity, would lead to new clash of civilizations, as Arrighi et al., put it in their analysis of emerging capitalism in East, South East and South Asia? (Arrighi et al., 1999). While the first scenario (i.e., massive migration of people after decolonization) contributed to "multiculturalism" in European and U.S. metropolis, the second scenario (i.e., massive migration of capital after the end of the Cold War) creates a different kind of "multiculturalism". A "planetary multiculturalism" as it was generated by the re-structuring of capital diversity and ethnic differences. Of course, massive population migration doesn't go in reverse, from Europe and the U.S. to China, India,

Beijing, Bombay, Buenos Aires, or Cairo. I am not saying that these cities are beyond transformations engendered by migrations. I am saying that the problems Sandercock analyses in Los Angeles, and most of the problems encountered by city planners in Europe (Healey et al., 1997; Ratti and Reichman, 1993), are consequences of the massive migrations of labor force from the South to the North. And I am saying that the reverse situation does not apply. There is no massive migration of labor force from the North to the South, from London to Bombay; as there is no reverse migration of capital, from the South to the North.

The question of "multiculturalism" then is located somewhere else. The issues raised by "planetary multiculturalism" shall be dealt with in the larger colonial horizon of modernity and at various levels, from epistemology to politics, from economics to ethics. This is the moment in which macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality come back to center stage. If, as I indicated before, the self-regulatory mechanism of the market, the liberal ideology of the state and the socialist project of planetary social revolution are all global designs, all of them are entangled in the imaginary of (Western) modernity. There was no room to say much from the perspective of coloniality, since coloniality was considered the space of the uncivilized, barbarians, underdeveloped, religious and mythical, non-scientific and not totally rational. Macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality shall contribute to undo the macro-histories of colonialism from the perspective of modernity and, simultaneously, to imagine possible futures of conversations across the colonial difference. By conversations "across the colonial difference" I have in mind another of the Zapatistas's (theoretical) dictum: because we are all equal we have the right to be different. This is also the scenario in which I think in terms of "participation" instead of "inclusion". If modernity is an incomplete project then its completion may not necessarily take place from the perspective of modernity itself, whose global designs would generously incorporate the margins. In this scenario the Zapatistas's dictum would be interpreted as something like "we recognize and respect the differences as far as we all agree that we are all equals as we think it should be".

The "planetary multiculturalism" of the twentieth first century will make of translation a primordial necessity. But before discussing translation I would like to dispel the possible misunderstanding that the previous paragraph may provoke. I was not suggesting that the emerging geo-historical zones of capital accumulation and the re-structuring of global

emergence and consolidation of capitalism linked to the Atlantic from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Fernand Braudel described four “super-world-economies” that were formed up to the fifteenth century:

The Far East taken as a whole, consisted of three gigantic world-economies: Islam, overlooking the Indian Ocean from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, and controlling the endless chain of deserts stretching across Asia from Arabia to China; India, whose influence extended throughout the Indian Ocean, both East and West of Cape Comorin; and China at once a great territorial power – striking deep into the heart of Asia – and a maritime force, controlling the seas and countries bordering the Pacific. And so it had been for many hundreds of years. *But between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, it is perhaps permissible to talk of a single world-economy broadly embracing all three* (Braudel, 1984, p. 484; italics mine).

Braudel’s would be one interpretation. Other possible interpretations based on available data, would be to say that between the fifteenth and the eighteenth century a new “gigantic world economy” emerged, the Atlantic commercial circuit, that in three centuries grew up to the level of the previous one and develop a new economic structure, capitalism. It was only since the nineteenth century, and particularly with the consolidation of the British Empire in India, that the Atlantic-capitalist economy began to “embrace” and impose itself on the other three. At the end of the twentieth century the scenario is changing again. The economies of the Far East that coexisted with capitalism from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, that began to be transformed by capitalism during the nineteenth and the twentieth century without becoming capitalist economies themselves, are embracing and transforming capitalism. Contrary to the period between the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries when strong economic blocs coexisted (and capitalism was one of them), at the end of the twentieth century a process of capital diversity and corresponding clash of civilizations is taking place. The process is further complicated by the ethnic/national differences that shaped subjectivities during the period of nation/state.

Translation becomes here of essence, although no longer and necessarily in the sense and direction the concept was established and used from the perspective of modernity. What are needed are translation theories supported in macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality. To imagine possible futures in a world of diversified capitalism, ethnic diversity and clashes of civilization (as Kosovo bear witnesses), translation has to be conceived beyond linguistic proper and beyond the directionality in which translation and modernity went together in brewing and exporting global designs. Basically, translation was at the

service of the building of the modern/colonial world. Fra missionaries translated the Bible from Latin to Nahuatl, and knowledge to Latin and Spanish, in order to “transmit” Western knowledge to Mexican. The same purpose nourished Mahew China practicing a double translation with one-direction project to convert Chinese to Christianity. Translation from Chinese and to Latin, Italian or Spanish did not have the same function. Trans reverse did not have the purpose of converting Christian Eri Buddhism or to Nahuatlism, but to better understand those w targeted for conversion to Christianity.

Translation and epistemology worked in the same direction thri entire historical process of building, transforming and maintai modern/colonial world. When Marx, Habermas, Derrida, K Hayeck, etc., are translated into languages in which the texts specific authors have been written (i.e., German, English and Fre conflicts of the modern-Western world are reproduced in the which Westernization took place in the past five centuries. Tra from Mandarin, Hindi, Arabic, etc., are not done, like in the century, with the purpose of importing global designs from Chi or the Arabic World to the Western world. Therefore, the first q be examined in translation is the colonial difference in the a-s power relations between languages, knowledge and coloniality. first thing to be examined is coloniality of power.

Rangan acknowledges Sandercock’s claim that “planning in c diverse and culturally-diversified settings requires both *recogn translation between* different ‘rationalities’” (this issue, p. 52). S with a cautionary note, that the “very process of attempting tr ‘inclusive citizenship’ *necessitates* rational – as in logical, cohe systematic – and comprehensive approaches to planning” (Rar issue, p. 52). But, since Rangan does not discuss planning in mc (North Atlantic) but in the “peasant-periphery,” of India, she bri foreground the blind spot in Sandercock’s position (also in Fri and Harvey’s) when she observes:

Sandercock, for her part, does not even attempt to distinguish between *d’etat* of states in the so-called First, Second and Third World. In her di examples of insurgent practices, the character of the state is presu congruent with ‘the modern state’, regardless of the particularities of st and planned action in different countries (Rangan, this issue, p. 53).

“Translation between” different rationalities means displa directionality of translation in the imaginary of the modern colon

The rationalities and gnoseology implied in Aymara or Chinese languages are not quite the same than the gnoseology implied in modern/colonial languages, particularly the languages of knowledge (e.g., sciences, natural and social; and philosophy) in the modern world (English, French, German) with their particular language-epistemic legacies (Greek and Latin). Epistemology, in the modern/colonial world, was founded in and by imperial languages (I repeat: English, German and French), grounded in the classical legacy (I repeat: Greek and Latin, but not Arabic; Mignolo, 1998). Beyond that territory, knowledge in other languages was considered non-sustainable. Now, to talk about "translation between different rationalities" in a planetary scenario means to work on the map drawn by coloniality of power and charted by the epistemic colonial differences. From the very moment in which Latin (and its coalition with Greek language and thought), Spanish, Italian and Portuguese displaced Arabic, Hebrew, Amerindians and African languages from the domain of sustainable knowledge until the moment that English, French and German did the same with Hindi, Arabic (again), Mandarin, Japanese, etc., translation was always already conceived in two complementary directions. One was the Westernization of the world and the other the Western consumption of non-Western cultures, like the New York Museum of Natural History where Amerindians, Africans and Chinese cohabit with polar bears and colorful fishes; and where an exhibit of Voodoo passes as a "natural" event.

Harvey also places the accent on translation, but his interests are not similar to those expressed by Rangan. "The planner must be able to translate political aspirations across the incredible variety and heterogeneity of socio-ecological and political-economic conditions into the discursive regimes of professional planning" (Harvey, this issue, p. 281). One of the compelling reasons to underline translation is, for Harvey, the following:

[...] without translation, collective forms of action become impossible and all potentiality for an alternative politics disappears. The fluid ability of capitalists and their agents to translate among themselves using the basic languages of money, commodity and property (backed, where necessary, with the theoretical language of a reductionist economics) is one of their towering class strengths. Any insurgent oppositional movement must do this just as well if not better. (Harvey, in this issue, p. 282).

Paradigmatic because they changed the directionality of translation (Mignolo, 1997; Mignolo and Schiwy, forthcoming). Sub-Comandante Marcos was able to open Marxist cosmology and let it be "infected" by Amerindian cosmology. In the same way, Major Ana Maria, Comandante Tacho and David allowed their cosmologies to be infected by Marxism. A double directionality in translation that contributes to correct the imbalance established by the coloniality of power and the colonial difference, where Marxist cosmology has been recognized but not Amerindian one. And pioneering because of the introduction of Amerindian cosmology into the discussion of the future of Mexican democracy, linked to translation, allowed for the transformation of the concept of democracy itself. A concept of modern political theory, rooted of course in Greece, common to Marxists and (neo) liberals, cannot be avoided by Amerindian's even if there was and there is, in their communities, concepts equivalent to Western "democracy". But, from the perspective of the Amerindians, the Zapatista's dictum ("to rule and be ruled at the same time") is a condensed theory that introduces, in the particular history of Amerindians in Latin America, a third voice, neither (neo) liberal nor Marxist, but in conversation with both. Translation thus understood introduces a necessary element of epistemic and conceptual transculturation that I have elaborated elsewhere as "border thinking" or "border epistemology".

Border thinking requires translation, but requires also a perspective. Translation can only be, of necessity, border thinking when it is exercised from the perspective of subalternity; of subaltern knowledges and cosmologies. Translation as border thinking brings of necessity transculturation. Translation performed from the dominant perspective I described before can not result in border thinking but in assimilation (although it may be with good will) and control (although it may be with honest purposes). Thus, epistemic transculturation (e.g., translation between different rationalities) can only result in border thinking when is performed from a subaltern perspective and, as such, oppositional to coloniality of power (Mignolo and Schiwy, forthcoming). Finally, the ultimate goal of border thinking as oppositional practice is not recognition and inclusion but, rather, affirmation and diversification of rationalities, participation (in the sense described by Dussel) and diversity of epistemic (historical, logical) locations. That is to say, it attempts to erase the colonial

difference that is always maintained in projects in which the final goal is

We come here, in this argument, to the question of the frame for planning, for any planning, urban or global. The frame cannot be but local from local histories (in the "center" or in the "peripheries") in their complex relations with global designs (e.g., either local histories where global designs are produced or local histories in where global designs are received). Macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality come again into the picture, now enriched by the concepts of translation, epistemic transculturation and border thinking. Let's go back to Harvey's claim for the moment of universality and his need for the "definition of political projects". Limited to Western global designs (be it the self-regulatory mechanism of the market, the ambiguities of the neo-liberal states, either in the North or in the South, or the Marxist emancipatory utopia), Harvey cannot but look for a "rew" abstract universal. For him, and from Western global designs he has in his horizon, the alternatives to hegemonic universalism that are not in their turn universal in scope, cannot be but weak regionalist projects. The introduction of "thirdness" around the world, as the Zapatistas illustrate in their paradigmatic and pioneering example, is for Harvey out of sight.

What do I mean by "thirdness"? I would like to think of possible futures not in terms of universality or "new abstract universals", as Harvey as well as Slavoj Žižek propose (Žižek, 1998) refurbishing Western tradition, in its liberal and socialist versions, but in terms of diversity (and not universality). Or, which is the same, in terms of "diversity as a universal project". I am not thinking "diversity" in terms of ethnicity but in terms of epistemology in tandem with "universality". Therefore, diversity or, still, pluri-versality in the sense of divers rationalities working toward the common good. I prefer to imagine, with Marxist philosopher and theologian of liberation, Franz Hinkelammert, that an-other logic is needed to cope with the crisis of the (neo) liberal and the (neo) Marxist paradigms. He asserts that the current crisis of abstract universalism cannot be contested with another abstract universalism, although a universal answer is needed. What Hinkelammert is asking for is an-other logic that would eventually change the terms rather than the content of the conversation.

Hinkelammert's "an-other logic" can be taken in two directions, market fragmentation and epistemic diversity (or diversality). By "market fragmentation" he refers to a practice that would counter the global designs geared toward homogenization; that is, the universal and abstract principles of global market. One of the task is, for Hinkelammert, the fragmentation of world market by means of a *logic of plurality*, which he

conceives as a necessary condition for any liberation project ("Fr el mercado mundial mediante una *logica de lo plural es una c imprescindible de un proyecto de liberacion hoy") (Fragmen world market by means of a *logic of plurality* is a necessary c today, for any liberation project) (1997, p. 238). On the other h "Fragmentation of the market" needs an "imaginary" (or a philosophy) that Hinkelammert finds in one of the Zapatistas's d build a world composed of many worlds. "Inclusion" is not pa imaginary, since the image of a world composed by many worlds a network of worlds (without a center) rather than a circle or which the marginals will be "included" within an "including" pr center. The Zapatistas's claim is not for inclusion into the univers the simple right of participation in building diversity.*

#### 4. Concluding remarks: radical planning, critical theory, radical transformations

In her contribution to the book on liberation ecology edited by Peet and Michal Watts (Peet and Watts, 1996), Rangan studied movements in Nepal and, based on this study, she advances a existing critique to developmental theories. She concludes by that:

As the Utranchal movement sends out its message of secular develop social justice, scholarly criticism of "maldevelopment" (Shiva, 1991), d as a mechanism of underdevelopment (Gadgil and Guha, 1992), a alternatives to development (Escobar, 1995), bears the curious aura of a *populism*. It seems ironic that contemporary scholarly debates should c "post-development" era, just when voices from the *margins* – so ce discourses of *difference* and alternative culture – are demanding the greater access to a more generous idea of development (Rangan, 1996, 1

Rangan is here confusing – it seems to me – reform with tran and she is assuming that the struggle shall go only in one dir direction demanded by social movements. This position has f the "curious aura of a reactionary populism". What Rang distinguish here is that the critique to development and t *alternatives to development* is a critique addressed to the th implementation of global designs as, for instances, the report of Commission on Environment and Development (Escobar, 199

critique is not a political program oriented toward the moving forward the masses. Reform and transformation are indeed two complementary projects. If, on the one hand, asking to be included in modern and developing projects is a necessary and a "progressive" move, in the long run, the necessary and "progressive" move would be, it seems to me, alternatives to *development*, which is the call – in my understanding – of philosophy of liberation. There is nothing wrong, and much right, to have both projects active at the same time and not to play one against the other. Alternatives to development presuppose that it is possible to imagine economic organizations that are not driven by the desire of accumulation and the belief that increasing productivity will benefit the entire population of the planet. In order to imagine such possible futures, macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality are necessary. Such macro-narratives would contribute to remember that the imaginary of the modern/colonial world has negated alternative knowledges, economies and ways of life, that today they return as an internal critique of the colonial difference continues to be reproduced and alternative to the modern world negated. Certainly, there is no "pure" epistemology "out there", beyond the boundaries of modern epistemology and economy. But precisely that "impurity", the contamination of subalternized knowledges during the long history of Western expansion, with Western epistemology that created the conditions and the possibility of border thinking and border epistemology. Alternatives to development, possible futures cannot longer be thought out from within modernity itself, within the confines of its own genealogy, from Greece, Rome to modern Christian and colonial North Atlantic. But they cannot longer be thought out from "outside" since there is no outside anymore. But they can be thought out from the "interior exteriority" of the colonial difference where border thinking begins to germinate.

Slavoj Žizek made, recently, a different call. He called for a return to the sources and for a "Eurocentrism from the left". I cannot do justice here to Žizek's elaborated (and at the same time for me unconvincing) argument in which he claims that the insistence on "difference" (e.g., multiculturalism, identity politics) has killed the "political proper". But I would like to retain his conclusion:

From the sublime heights of Jurgen Habermas's theory to vulgar market

negotiations - a clear indication that we are dealing with the reduction of politics social *Polizei*. *Against this end-of-ideology politics, one should insist on the potent of democratic politicization as the true European legacy from ancient Greece onward.* Will be able to invent a new mode of repoliticization questioning the undisputed reign of global capital? *Only such a repoliticization of our predicament can break the vicious cycle of liberal globalization destined to engender the most regressive forms fundamentalist hatred* (Žizek, 1998, p. 1009; italics mine, underlining Žizek's).

I have been arguing that it is necessary to go back to the inception of modernity/coloniality and to generate macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality. From that moment onwards, new forms of politics emerged that were successfully repressed on the name of ancient Greece and of an emerging, at that point, European legacy. Macro-narratives from the perspective of coloniality and border thinking from the perspective of subalternity could help in a re-politicization that once and for all will no longer be dependent on ancient Greece, the universality of European legacy (although it should be recognized and included!) and aftermath. For this it would be useful to go back to Max Horkheimer and to recast his distinction between "traditional and critical theory" and to play for "the social function of philosophy." Enrique Dussel (1998b) I already made a significant contribution in this direction by bringing it together with Rigoberta Menchú and the Zapatistas.

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